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ABSTRACT 
This research project will examine the DoD Software Acquisition process 
utilizing Jay Forrester’s System Dynamics methodology.  Well known acquisition issues 
and policies will be examined with specific focus on oversight, process integration, 
process discipline, and knowledge management.  These issues will be examined for 
causality and dependent relationships.  Additionally, a proof of concept systems 
dynamics model will be developed to simulate the system and test possible interventions 
for organizational structure and policy. 
DISCLAIMER: This paper contains judgments and conclusions of the author. It 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
DoD systems are increasingly software dependent.  Software acquisition has 
become increasingly more complex from a technical perspective as well as from a 
management perspective.  The increased reliance on Industry and the increased 
complexity of systems creates challenges for the current acquisition structure and system.  
These challenges have existed for decades but seem amplified by software.  Some 
common issue areas are oversight, senior leadership, process discipline, mature 
technology, and knowledge management. 
Systematic problems are typically a result of system structure.  The current 
software acquisition model is platform-centric where programs compete for funds and 
resources.  This paper will examine a domain-centric model where the respective domain 
manages a portfolio of investments with an enterprise product-line architecture.   
Not only are there technical challenges, but there are resource challenges as well.  
A RAND study predicts .4 percent growth in the labor force over the next decade with .3 
percent the following decade.  Questions also abound over how strong the labor force 
will be for science and math skills with current outputs of the U.S. education system.  A 
reduced labor force for skilled workers means higher competition with Industry for 
qualified personnel.  Consider these trends with the upcoming transfer of the Baby Boom 
generation into retirement and a scary picture emerges. 
The goal of this research is to examine these issue areas and determine 
dependencies and relationships for possible interventions.  We will use System Dynamics 
methodology to develop a proof of concept model to simulate the software acquisition 
process for policy and analysis. 
 xvi




The current situation is characterized by massively accelerated cost 
growth in many major defense programs, lack of confidence by senior 
leaders, and no appreciable improvement in the defense acquisition system 
in the past two decades    -- DAPA Project Team Report December 2005 
DoD’s programs for acquiring major weapon systems have taken longer, cost 
more, and have delivered fewer quantities and capabilities than planned. GAO has 
documented these problems for decades. Most recently, GAO reported that 27 major 
weapon programs assessed since they began product development have experienced cost 
increases of nearly 34 percent over their original research, development, test, and 
evaluation (RDT&E) estimates, and increases of almost 24 percent in acquisition cycle 
time. 
Although the military services fight together on the battlefield as a joint force, 
they do not identify warfighting needs and make weapon system investment decisions in 
the same manner. DoD has taken steps to identify warfighting needs from a more joint 
requirements perspective, but the department’s service-centric structure and fragmented 
decision-making processes are at odds with the integrated, portfolio management 
approach used by successful commercial companies to make enterprise-level investment 
decisions. (GAO, 2007) 
A. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Systems are becoming more and more software intensive.  According to a 
Defense Science Board’s Task Force on Defense Software report (2000), military aircraft 
dependency on software increased from approximately 10 percent functionality on the F-
4 to 80 percent functionality on the F-22—equivalent to a 2 percent per year increase 
(1960-1995).  Though hardware is following Moore’s Law and gaining in performance 
and capacity at an exponential rate, DoD software acquisitions seem to be following 
Murphy’s Law with schedule and cost overruns and less than desirable delivered 
capability. 
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The Software Engineering Life Cycle is a complex system driven by interactions 
and feedback loops across various stages.  New software development must undergo the 
rigors of a six phase process: concept development, requirements development, design, 
software development, test, and release.  A program manager seeking to field a new 
software application can normally expect a multiyear effort from concept to deployment.  
For ready-made commercial off the self (COTS) products, the concept and development 
phase is reduced, but the product must still undergo the scrutiny of testing and 
certification through an external release process. 
The objective of this study is to develop a high level acquisition model for DoD to 
simulate knowledge-based polices and constructs in order to improve the software 
acquisition process.  The model can be used as a high level starting point for policy 
makers, domain managers, or program managers to run policy what-if scenarios or 
analyze current problems for future decision making. 
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Our research methodology is based on the System Dynamics (SD) methodology 




Figure 1.   System Dynamics Methodology  
To develop situational awareness, we conducted a literary review of various GAO 
and DoD assessments, held various interviews with former and current program 
managers, and reviewed OSD/ASN congressional testimony and policy documents.  
Chapter II will provide a brief discussion of the Acquisition Process and the various 
embedded relationships.  Chapter III will introduce the model hypothesis with a 
supporting industry case study.  Chapter IV will introduce a brief summary of System 
Dynamics and our causal representation of the system based on relationships from 
Chapter II.  Chapter V will introduce system dynamics model and describe formulations 
representing the acquisition system.  Chapter VI will baseline model to current 
environment and simulate various policy what-if scenarios.  Finally, Chapter VII will 
offer conclusions and areas for further research. 
4 
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II. RECURRING THEMES 
We begin by first documenting the existing acquisition process for software 
intensive systems.  After a brief overview of the process we will discuss common areas of 
concern from various sources and DoD assessments.  These areas of concern will provide 
the basis for constructing our system dynamics model.  Based on these concerns we will 
then examine causality and linkage between the different issue areas.  Once we have 
identified causality and linkage, we will then propose a model to simulate the system.  
Once system is simulated, we will propose possible interventions to address areas of 
concern.   
A. SLOW AND CUMBERSOME ACQUISITION PROCESS 
DOD has three major processes involved in making weapon system investment 
decisions. These processes, depicted in Figure 2, are the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS), the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
(PPBE) system, and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). 
 
Figure 2.   DoD Requirements, Budgeting, and Acquisition Processes 
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These processes can be described as service-centric, program centric, extremely 
complex, and slow.  This is due to the fact that they are designed and organized around 
the competition, control, and flow of funds. 
This competitive service-centric structure leads to a fragmented decision-making 
process that impedes DOD’s ability to prioritize warfighting needs or leverage existing 
knowledge and information across the enterprise (DoD, 2006).  The military services 
identify warfighting needs individually, and department-level organizations are not 
optimized to integrate the services’ results or to evaluate their fiscal implications early in 
the process. Historically, this approach has contributed to duplication in weapon systems 
and equipment that does not interoperate. At the department level, Functional Capability 
Boards oversee each of the eight functional areas, reviewing the services’ assessments, 
and providing recommendations to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), 
which leads the JCIDS process. However, defense experts and DOD officials report that 
the Functional Capability Boards do not have the staff or analytical resources required to 
effectively evaluate service assessments within the context of the broader capability 
portfolio and assess whether the department can afford to address a particular capability 
gap. Several recent studies have recommended that DOD increase joint analytical 
resources for a less insular understanding of warfighting needs.  The boards also lack the 
authority to make or enforce decisions divesting their capability area of existing programs 
to pay for new ones.  This leaves DoD with ongoing programs that are scheduled to 
deliver capability that is either obsolete or no longer useful. 
Resource allocation decisions are made through a separate process, the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system (PPBE), which hinders the department’s 
ability to weigh the relative costs, benefits, and risks of investing in new weapon systems. 
Within the PPBE system, the individual military services are responsible for budgeting 
and allocating resources under authority that is commonly understood to be based on 
Title 10 of the United States Code.  PPBE is structured by military service and defense 
program, although the department integrates data on the services’ current and projected 
budget requests under 11 crosscutting mission areas called Major Force Programs. The 
cross-cutting view provided by the Major Force Program structure is intended to facilitate 
a strategic basis for resource allocation, allowing the Secretary of Defense to more easily 
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see where the greatest mission needs are and to re-allocate funds to meet those needs 
regardless of which service stands to gain or lose. However, GAO has reported in the past 
that the Major Force Program structure has not provided sufficient visibility in certain 
mission areas.  Moreover, although they cut across the services, the program mission 
areas are not consistent with the more recently established capability areas used in the 
JCIDS process, and as a result, it is difficult to relate resources to capabilities (GAO, 
2007). 
The Defense Acquisition System is based on four phases. Requirements, Design, 
Develop, and Field.  Testing can also be considered a phase but Testing is more effective 
if integrated early in the development process.  Our model will concentrate on the DoD 
Software Acquisition Process. It is our belief that the Software Acquisition Process can 
be structured in a way to complement and improve the JCIDS process while also 
mitigating the financial instability caused by the PPBE process.  If DoD can develop 
software faster and cheaper, the problems associated with the PPBE process are lessened.  
If DoD can develop software products at a higher quality and with better integration, the 
requirements process also becomes a little easier to navigate. 
B. RECURRING THEMES WITHIN SOFTWARE ACQUISITION 
1. Workforce Capacity 
One of the most alarming issues with regard to workforce capacity is the low ratio 
of in-house support to outside contractor support.  This is a function of the resident 
knowledge within the program per actual number of personnel.  The DoD acquisition 
workforce experienced a 55% decrease from 1987-2006 (DoD, 2007).  Coupled with 
senior acquisition officials reaching retirement age, and the increasing dynamic 
complexity of software, there is now a significant knowledge shortfall concerning the 
acquisition of software intensive systems.  DoD has developed the Lead System 
Integrator model as a solution but this model only works if there is a certain level of 
knowledge resident in the program for oversight and control. From this relationship we 
see that the lower the level of knowledge and experience results in higher dependence 
upon outside contractor support.   
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The Acquisition community is presently at a low level and expected to proceed 
even lower once the Baby Boom generation enters the retirement window.  Furthermore, 
the U.S. labor force is estimated to grow at only a level of .4 percent from 2010-2020 
followed by .3 percent from 2020-2030 (RAND, 2006).  A cursory look at the available 
talent pool shows our current education system is producing fewer scientists and 
engineers while Asia and India are producing more and more. We are witnessing a 
technical shift in capacity from the United States to Asia and India.  Such trends as 
globalization and outsourcing will work to reinforce this dynamic even further.  
Government will not be able to compete with Industry for the remaining “knowledge 
workers” that will exist in the U.S. workforce. This dynamic will create a significant 
knowledge shortfall in the Acquisition community.  The Acquisition community is 
preparing for this eventual dip in capacity by identifying critical skill sets and 
certifications with plans to minimize the baby boomer effect by formal training methods. 
(OSD, 2006).  Formal training methods account for only 10-20% of the knowledge 
growth within an organization.  Informal learning or experience accounts for the breadth 
of knowledge and builds the basis or data set for formal training.  Assuming a retirement 
age of 66, 76% of the acquisition workforce will enter the retirement window in 2012.  
This significant drop in knowledge will require not only formal training and critical 
identification of skills, but structures to build domain experience as quickly as possible.   
2. Oversight 
Oversight is the ability to monitor and give direction for the effective 
management of a project.  Based on current literature, current DoD oversight processes 
and procedures do not appear to be adequate or effective.  According to 97% of the 
DAPA survey respondents, the current oversight and leadership process is deficient.  In 
accordance with statute, the ASD(NII) and the DoD Component Acquisition Executives 
(CAEs) are responsible for acquisition oversight of IT acquisition programs, including 
serving as the Milestone Decision Authority for the programs under their cognizance 
(GAO, 2006).  This is a relationship primarily between the Program Manager 
(Component Representative) and the ASD(NII)/CAE oversight team.  OSD has made  
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significant efforts to limit required reporting and reduce layers of oversight, but again, 
due to the nature of software intangibility, dynamic complexity of programs, and the lack 
of comparable data across domains, oversight is hard to capture and enforce.   
There is an interesting dynamic to oversight.  DoD has reduced the layers of 
oversight to no more than two levels between PM and OSD, however, due to increased 
reliance on industry, the issue is largely oversight of the contractor through to the PM.  
There is an optimal structure for a knowledge-based organization as well as an optimum 
size.  In Malcolm Gladwell’s book, “The Tipping Point”, he discusses the idea that for a 
group of up to 150 members, there is a "community memory" that works such that either 
you know how to find something out, you do it yourself, or you know the person who 
does. Beyond this threshold of 150, he argues, an individual no longer knows whom to 
turn to, and must go through intermediaries, resulting in a communication breakdown. 
Research in cognition supports this argument, as documented in Robin Dunbar's 
Grooming, Gossip, and The Evolution of Language.  Professor Dunbar discovered a 
relationship among primates between the relative size of their cortex and the number of 
primates inside a social group.  He further concludes that language evolved as the basis 
for bonding to a social group, and there is an inherent limit to the amount of social 
interaction that we can handle based on the size of our cortex.  As human communities 
grew too large for each member to personally associate through gestures, we developed 
language. The structure of language, including the words that we use, is designed for the 
purpose of advancing the social and sociological goals of the communities and the 
individuals who use them. This theory also integrates well with the problem of data 
semantics and different communities of interest.  In summary, we can conclude that it is 
likely that for large scale projects involving more than 150 personnel, it may very well be 
more difficult to provide meaningful oversight.  The current trend in DoD is larger and 
larger programs that deal with not just one system but families of systems.  The Army’s 
Future Combat System (FCS) is a prominent example as well as the Navy’s ERP system 
for business modernization.  Structured processes and metrics can alleviate this but 
today’s acquisition environment with numerous contractors and subcontractors means 
that most processes and metrics are contractor dependent and not standard from project to 
project. 
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So the dynamic of reduced layers of oversight from PM to MDA, increased layers 
of oversight from contractor to PM, increased industry dependence, and increasingly 
larger and more complex programs, has made it worse for managers to socialize with 
subordinates and vendors to effectively capture what is going on in their respective 
programs.   
One issue is the sheer size and number of programs within DoD.  The second 
issue is the lack of mature processes with normalized metrics to compare scope, team 
composition, funding profiles, and performance results.  Every program is different, and 
unique, however, one would expect that the program makeup for one DoD avionics 
system should be fairly similar to the program makeup of another DoD avionics system. 
In other words, it would be desirable if domains developed open architectures across the 
services horizontally rather than being service-specific. Possibly a Joint SPO can 
engineer the open architecture with standard processes, data semantics, and metrics for a 
respective domain.  The Joint SPO would act as the domain lead and be responsible for 
oversight of their domain to the ASD(NII)/CAE oversight team.  Services can then be 
responsible for their portfolio of investments within this respective domain. (See possible 
structure in Figure 3)   
 
 
Figure 3.   Possible Knowledge Based Domain Centric Organizational Structure 
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In summary, the key to achieving effective oversight is an integrated structure that 
allows social interaction and knowledge transfer among all key members.  The 
organization should also possess and continually nurture mature and standardized 
processes with valuable metrics for feedback and optimization.  
3. Integration 
Integration can be assessed by the actual hands on process time and the addition 
of any non value added delays - internal or external to the process.  The goal of 
integration is to reduce delays and create value.  Value creation depends on the focus of 
the organization and the mission it supports.  This focus on value is sometimes referred to 
as the value chain and requires a high level enterprise effort to align all members in 
support of the value chain.  DoD does not appear to have a value chain for software.  We 
would like to change that by highlighting the benefits of such a change, however, we 
cannot ignore the fact that intra-agency integration for software is an issue as well.  
Below is a notional timeline for SPAWAR San Diego’s Software External Release 
Process.   
Notional Timeline
External Processes 3 Months 6 Months 9 Months 12 Months 15 Months 18 Months
SHIPMAIN (8 Months)
ECO / ILS Certification (6 Months)
Security Accreditation (6 Months)
PPL/SSIL (3 Months)
SPAWAR CCB (1 Month)
TIDS & SUBLAN Testing (Submarines) (3 Months)
FRCB (Shore Sites) (2 Months)
C5IMP CCB (Surface Ships) (2 Months)
C5IMP CCB (Submarines) (2 Months)
NMCI Testing and Certification (NMCI Shore Sites) (6 Months)





Figure 4.   SPAWAR External Release Process Notional Timeline 
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The key actors in the External Software Release Process are SPAWAR, 
NAVSEA, and COMNETWARCOM. SPAWAR is the lead agent and responsible actor 
for getting quality systems to the fleet. As such, the processes or services that require the 
most time are external to SPAWAR. One process is the DoD Information Technology 
Security & Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) or the pending update to DITSCAP – the 
DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP). This 
process deals with the certification and accreditation of information technology (IT) 
systems. The second process is the Surface Ship and Aircraft Carrier Modernization 
Program (SHIPMAIN). SHIPMAIN was developed to focus on the early decision process 
regarding which alterations are to be accomplished and add discipline into the 
accountability and adherence to the Fleet Modernization Plan associated processes. The 
SHIPMAIN process ensures Configuration Management, Certification and Accreditation, 
other required certifications, and funding are aligned and in place. 
SHIPMAIN, through the use of the Navy Data Environment (NDE) and the one 
master electronic document for maintenance – the Ship Change Document (SCD), adds 
much needed discipline and oversight to ensuring certifications are met before fielding 
systems to the fleet.  The SHIPMAIN process has three key phases that are repeated three 
times similar to the milestone decisions in the Defense Acquisition Cycle.  (Appendix A).  
These three phases, however, do not happen in parallel with the acquisition cycle but at 
the end.  Key areas like Technical Assessment have large non value added delay due to 
resource constraints. For software and hardware maintenance actions, the technical 
assessment primarily consists of a ship drawings check and confirmation by the Ship 
Platform Manager (SPM) that they approve of the system.  The delay is simply due to the 
large amount of actions and a small office.  A second source of non value added delay is 
the voting system at the three different decision points.  Once Technical Assessment, 
Cost Benefit Analysis, and Armed Figure of Merit are complete, the SCD is then emailed 
out to approximately 50-60 voting members, mostly on the East Coast.  If someone 
departs on leave or does not vote right away, the process stops.  The submitter must wait 
until that person returns from leave or contact a dissenting voter to resolve the issue.  
Common concerns were cases of people on leave with no identified relief who could 
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move the SCD through the decision point.  A second concern was random office codes 
stopping the SCD due to misunderstanding of roles and responsibilities. 
SHIPMAIN is a relatively new process and has shown positive benefits for the 
prioritization of funds and maintenance effort.  Unfortunately, most software and 
hardware upgrade cycles are 6 months to a year in duration.  The added certifications for 
processes such as SHIPMAIN and DITSCAP take at least a year to eighteen months.  
This means the fleet will always be behind in already mature technology.  Better 
integration and coordination of processes are needed.   
One possible solution is to regionalize software similar to the maintenance 
regionalization effort, and identify software as an enterprise value chain with SPAWAR 
as the lead regional agent with collocated NAVSEA and COMNETWARCOM cross 
functional teams.  The objective of the cross functional teams would be to provide 
DITSCAP and SHIPMAIN services at a more integrated level with current software 
processes.   
4. Funding Instability 
Congressional, OSD, and service related program assessments, nonrecurring 
decrements, and other budget reductions, have an impact on acquisition programs. These 
reductions require PEO’s to prioritize their requirements and reprogram resources to meet 
mission requirements. PEOs and PMs attempt to mitigate the impact of budget reductions 
through internal reprogramming and other actions to keep all programs healthy. 
Stabilized Funding is the largest concern among project managers and is 
identified as the strongest enabler for accurately predicting program cost, schedule and 
performance.  The lack of stable funding creates discontinuity in the system which leads 
to a new learning curve and startup time.  This new learning curve, in turn, creates an 
unpredictable cost and schedule, and degrades the ability of management to develop an 
effective Acquisition Strategy.  An ineffective Acquisition Strategy leads to a loss of 
confidence by Senior Leadership, who then applies more intervention and more 
oversight.  Budget and schedule adjustments are made, with the staffing profile adjusted 
and set according to requirements, schedule, and budget.  Funding profile changes once 
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again and the cycle of instability continues.  The best way to minimize this effect is by 
programs or increments of capabilities that can be delivered quickly, that is, in less than 
five years (GAO, 2006). 
It should be noted that stabilized funding is not suitable for all programs.  If this 
were the case, programs that do not meet desired objectives would still acquire funding 
and be fielded with no added capabilities.  Stabilized funding should only be applied to 
programs that meet the desired measures of performance for desired capability objectives.  
If the desired capability changes, then subsequent funding should also change.  DoD is 
moving in this direction with portfolio management, but it is still hard to find and end 
programs that don’t meet desired capability objectives.  This is due to the platform 
centric nature of acquisition and program competition to stay alive.  Competition is good 
for nurturing performance but creates barriers for information sharing and visibility into 
the program.  A domain structure with measures of effectiveness for capabilities and 
performance can alleviate this problem as can incentives for domain performance vice 
program performance.  Programs that meet goals and have the highest measure of 
effectiveness for the DoD enterprise or component are ensured stable funding.  Programs 
that don’t meet these criteria must compete for remaining funds based on actual program 
performance. 
5. Industry Behavior 
Industry behavior is motivated largely by quarterly earnings and market share.  
DoD must take this into account for setting acquisition strategy and contracting policies.  
Firms will pull and push personnel to other projects in order to meet quarterly goals and 
maintain market share.  This can have serious implications for large scale, long term DoD 
projects.  A key attribute is a good staffing profile with the appropriate mix of 
experienced developers identified early and for the life of the effort. The Mythical Man 
Month by Frederick Brooks, discusses the dynamics of adding people late to an ongoing 
software development effort.  Adding people late makes the project later due to increased 
learning time and its dampening effect on productivity.  The experienced developers lose 
productivity due to the transfer of knowledge to inexperienced developers.  The delay due 
to inexperienced developers getting up to speed, and the reduced productivity by the 
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experienced developers combines to slow the project even more.  If Industry quarterly 
earnings behavior and market goals do not align with the short and long term goals of the 
program, this dynamic will occur and costs will grow.  
We have identified Workforce Capacity, Oversight, Process Integration, Funding 
Instability, and Industry Behavior as common areas of concern in the Software 
Acquisition Process.  We have also discussed the various factors and trends of the system 
that influence these issues.  Our next step is to determine common linkages among these 
areas and develop a model to simulate the system for further analysis. 
16 
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III. DYNAMIC HYPOTHESIS 
In Chapter II we discussed workforce capacity, oversight, process integration, 
funding instability, and industry behavior as common themes of concern in the Software 
Acquisition Process.  We now take these key themes and formulate a mental model of 
how these themes relate and interact.  
A.  MENTAL MODEL OF SOFTWARE ACQUISITION 
 
 
Figure 5.   Mental Model of Software Acquisition 
 
In our mental model shown in Figure 5, the following cause-effect relationships 
are apparent: 
1) An integrated organization improves oversight.  The organization can be 
integrated through structure, information sharing, and or social interaction.  
The ideal organization possesses all three of these characteristics. 
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2) Effective oversight leads to effective senior leadership. This relationship is 
primarily between OSD and the respective Program Manager (PM).  
However, there is both a Component Acquisition Executive and a Program 
Executive Officer in the hierarchy between them.  Direct communication 
between OSD and PM is infrequent.  OSD’s ability to provide oversight of 
a large number of DoD programs is essential for ensuring organizational 
goals and responsibilities are communicated and carried out effectively by 
senior leadership. 
3) Effective senior leadership ensures process discipline and standardization.  
Once process discipline and process standardization are achieved, 
processes can be repeated, measured, and optimized.   
4) Optimization improves the learning rate and adds knowledge to the system 
for decision makers.  The number of times a process is repeated, the better 
the learning rate and the higher the level of knowledge. 
5) As domain knowledge and experience increases, decision making and 
formulation of future requirements improves. 
6) Stable funding improves the decision process by adding certainty, 
reducing delays, and ensuring the timely utilization of resources. 
7) Industry behavior and the organization’s level of knowledge influences the 
chosen acquisition strategy.  Two examples of acquisition strategies are 
Spiral Development and the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) concept.  Both 
of these strategies depend on industry behavior and performance.  Both of 
these strategies are more effective if the organization has a certain level of 
resident knowledge to ensure oversight and to ensure requirements are 
met. 
8) The chosen acquisition strategy influences how effective senior leadership 
can monitor a program.  The LSI concept is an example of an acquisition 
strategy that makes it more difficult for senior leadership to oversee and 
monitor a program due to the increased responsibilities of contractor and 
the lower level of involvement by government officials.  The lower level 
of involvement is due to the fact that DoD does not have the level of 
knowledge or capacity to oversee all aspects of the program. 
The key issues in these relationships center around: 
1) Domain and technical knowledge, and 
2) Integration and coordination. 
What policy or organizational constructs will develop positive self reinforcing 
mechanisms to counteract the risk inherent in rapid technological change, funding 
instability, decreasing workforce capacity, and uncertain or changing requirements? 
One possible answer is to leverage experience curves or learning curves to shorten 
production times, build experience, improve schedule and budget forecasting.  Learning 
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or improvement curves were first pioneered in 1936 by T.P. Wright, who published his 
theory in the Journal of Aeronautical Sciences as part of an article entitled “Factors 
Affecting the Cost of Airplanes.”  Wright’s findings showed that, as the number of 
aircraft produced in sequence increased, the direct labor input per airplane decreased in a 
regular pattern that could be estimated mathematically. (NASA, 2007) 
Learning curves are typically used for estimating production costs but the same 
concepts can be applied for knowledge management.  As the process for creating a 
product is repeated, people learn and develop experience with the product that leads to 
improvement and more knowledge gained by the system.  This process will continue in a 
self reinforcing fashion until the product is fully mature and the maximum capacity for 
improvement has been reached. 
In software, this can be compared to product line architectures with reusable 
components.  For a product line architecture to be successful, there must be effective 
oversight and management of the domain to which the architecture will apply. 
Knowledge management is a social phenomenon based upon communities of 
interest, shared goals, human interaction, and informal learning.  Knowledge is typically 
categorized as either tacit or explicit knowledge.  Explicit knowledge can be captured and 
measured in artifacts such as spreadsheets, lookup tables, and IF..THEN statements. Tacit 
knowledge is based on individual or group mental models and experiences.  Tacit 
knowledge might be your personalized decision model of what to do once you’ve 
analyzed the spreadsheet data.  Developing tacit knowledge is key for any organization 
but even more important for acquisition and software intensive programs, since metrics 
may mean different things to different programs.  The metrics are important, but 
understanding how various metrics such as funding profile, development rate, staffing 
profile, schedule pressure, and technological maturity all relate to one another is even 
more important.  This tacit knowledge is developed through a social network of peers, 
colleagues and personal experience.  In order to fully exploit and develop knowledge 
based processes, organizations must either organize around knowledge (become domain 
centric) or develop policies to create reinforcing mechanisms for knowledge building and 
retention.  To capitalize on the explosion of information and the new capabilities that 
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advances in technology will bring, we must become domain centric vice program centric 
across DoD.  The following case study demonstrates the advantages and benefits of a 
domain centric approach. 
B. DOMAIN-CENTRIC CASE STUDY - CELSIUSTECH 
CelsiusTech Systems AB is a Swedish naval defense contractor that has 
successfully developed a product line approach for building large, complex, software 
intensive systems.  CelsiusTech was chosen due to the time duration and extent of 
research.  The initial assessment was performed in 1996 by the Carnegie Mellon Software 
Engineering Institute with a follow on assessment in 2006. 
CelsiusTech migrated to a product line architecture for a number of reasons, the 
principal of which was survival. In 1985, CelsiusTech (then Philips) was awarded two 
contracts simultaneously—one for the Swedish navy and one for the Danish navy. Both 
ships’ requirements indicated the need for systems larger and more sophisticated than 
CelsiusTech’s previous system.  (ASWEC, 1996) Looking at past experience and the 
need to build two even larger systems in parallel, management and senior technical staff 
reevaluated their business and technical approaches.  In its analysis, CelsiusTech 
determined that the continuation of the development technologies and practices applied 
on their Mk2.5 system were insufficient to produce the new systems with any reasonable 
certainty of schedule, cost, and required functionality. Staffing requirements alone would 
most likely have been prohibitive.  This situation provided the genesis of a new business 
strategy: recognizing the potential business opportunity of selling and building a series, 
or family, of related systems rather than relying upon a single monolithic system. This 
strategic realignment resulted in the creation of the SS2000 product line.  
Another business driver was the recognition of a 20- to 30-year life span for naval 
systems. During that time, changes in threat requirements and technology advances 
would have to be addressed, thus the more flexible and extendable the product line, the 
greater the business opportunities. These business drivers or requirements forged the 
product line strategy which resulted in CelsiusTech reducing their staffing profile and 




Figure 6.   Celsius Tech Schedule Performance 
 
Moving to a product line approach also required changes to the organizational 
structure.  CelsiusTech did not shift immediately to a domain based organization, but 
instead went through a transition period.  The following figures represent the change in 
organization from a project centric organization to a domain centric organization. 
 
 





Figure 8.   CelsiusTech Organization 1987-1991 
 
 
Figure 9.   CelsiusTech Organization 1994-Present 
 
As of 2006 CelsiusTech has produced the following metrics  (ASWEC, 2006): 
i. A family of 55 Ship Systems 
ii. Integration test of 1-1.5 million SLOC requires 1-2 people. 
iii. Rehosting to a new platform or OS takes 3 months. 
iv. Cost and schedule targets are predictably met. 
v. Performance and distribution behavior is known in advance. 
vi. Customer satisfaction is high. 





CelsiusTech’s experience suggests a viable strategy for software intensive 
systems.  DoD has realized that the service-centric approach is inefficient and has shifted  
to a “capabilities” concept where requirements are “born joint”. (DoD, 2004) Our 
solutions and systems should leverage knowledge and resources across domains and be 
“joint” as well. 
We have given an example of a successful domain-centric organization.  We will 
now apply these concepts to DoD’s Software Acquisition Process.  
24 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
25 
IV. SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL 
System Dynamics is an approach to understanding the behavior of complex 
systems that exhibit nonlinear behaviors over time.  It was developed by Professor Jay 
Forrester at MIT for industrial dynamics and focused on such management problems as 
instability in production, inventory, and employment.  Since then, the field of System 
Dynamics has been expanded to other applications such as urban growth, economic, and 
ecological systems.  It captures internal feedback loops and time delays that affect the 
behavior of the entire system. The system uses feedback loops, stocks and flows to assist 
in describing nonlinear, dynamically complex systems. There is no intrinsic limit on the 
size or complexity of systems that can be modeled; they may have thousands of elements 
or actors. The computer software creates an environment to run “what if” simulations to 
test policies and their effects as they change over time.  
Developing a systems dynamics model starts with identifying the problem of a 
system and the underlying cause and effect relationships.  These cause and effect 
relationships are then transformed into a mental model of the system.  These mental 
models are described and documented as causal loop diagrams that represent the system 
with feedback loops. From the causal loop diagram, equations or graphical relationships 
are formulated that put the model into consistent units and scale.  Now with the tweak of 
a sensitivity level, a user can learn more about the stocks that impact the problem 
domain’s big picture.  Given the appropriate data, it is a useful tool to simulate and 






Figure 10.   The Basic Steps for System Dynamics Modeling 
A. MODEL FORMULATIONS 
In Chapter III, we discussed our mental model of the system.  We now want to 
apply our mental model to the actual Software Acquisition Process.  We will do this by 
first developing a submodel to represent domain knowledge building.  We will then apply 
our knowledge management submodel to the knowledge points of the acquisition cycle.  
To track cost performance, we will also create a submodel to track budgeted costs versus 
actual costs of the work flowing through the system. 
B. THE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT SUBMODEL 
The system dynamics model we are developing represents organizational learning 
throughout the Software Acquisition Process.  People and organizations learn to a certain 
carrying capacity or ceiling.  The carrying capacity depends on the nature of the 
community and the maturity of the domain.  For our model, we will use Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRL) as a measure of knowledge for each domain.  A TRL value of 9 
represents a system proven in successful mission operations.  A final TRL value of 10, 
which is one level beyond Figure 11, will be used to represent a stable technology with 
high levels of organizational knowledge due to the fact the system has been in operation 
for some time and optimized with feedback from users. We will set the domain’s carrying 
capacity and knowledge ceiling to this value of 10. 
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Technology Readiness Level is a measure used by some United States 
government agencies and many major world's companies (and agencies) to assess the 
maturity of evolving technologies (materials, components, devices, etc.) prior to 
incorporating that technology into a system or subsystem. Generally speaking, when a 
new technology is first invented or conceptualized, it is not suitable for immediate 
application. Instead, new technologies are usually subjected to experimentation, 
refinement, and increasingly realistic testing. Once the technology is sufficiently proven, 
it can be incorporated into a system or subsystem.  Our model will proceed with the 
assumption that there is a level of knowledge associated with each TRL.  As the level of 
knowledge reaches our carrying capacity of 10, the technology is mature and our 
knowledge about the technology is fully mature and optimized.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Technology Readiness Level Definitions 
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As an organization goes through multiple iterations or production cycles learning 
increases.  (Chapter III).  As experience or level of knowledge accumulates with the 
number of iterations, the production costs and completion time often decrease with higher 
quality output.  It is recognized that repetition of the same operation results in less time or 
effort expended on that operation. For the Wright learning curve, the underlying 
hypothesis is that the direct labor man-hours necessary to complete a unit of production 
will decrease by a constant percentage each time the production quantity is doubled. If 
the rate of improvement is 20% between doubled quantities, then the learning percent 
would be 80% (100-20=80). While the learning curve emphasizes time, it can be 
extended to cost as well.  A NASA study has found the following learning curves for 
different domains (NASA, 2007):   
 
 
Table 1.   Industry Learning Curves 
We will use the logistics growth model to simulate this interaction of knowledge.  
The initial stage of growth in the logistics growth model is approximately exponential; 
then, as maturity begins, the growth slows, and at maturity, growth stops.  Essentially, 
growth (knowledge building) will occur at an exponential rate until reaching its carrying 
capacity.  For our purposes, the carrying capacity will be the required Technology 
Readiness Level (TRL). 
We will further scale our model to capture the process maturity of the 
organization.  In order to accomplish this, we must have a measure of how much value 
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these processes create.  The Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon Maturity 
and Integration (CMMI) model provides a good tool for value assessment within an 
organization’s processes.  As an organization’s CMMI level improves, productivity and 
quality increase, and uncertainty and risk decrease. (See Figure 12) 
 
 
Figure 12.   CMMI Maturity Levels 
We will use case study data from the Data and Analysis Center for Software 
(DACS) database.1  Based on nine case studies from this database, progressing up the 
CMMI model produces a 5.5 gain factor for Return on Investment (ROI) ratio for at least 
75% of the cases.  We will use this gain factor for the potential improvement in 
productivity and development based on an organization’s respective CMMI level. 
                                                 
1 The DACS is a Department of Defense (DoD) Information Analysis Center (IAC) and designated as 
the DoD Software Information Clearing house for state-of-the-art technical resources and information for 
the software community.  DACS is administratively managed by the Defense Technical Information Center 
(DTIC) under the DoD IAC Program. DACS is technically managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory 
- Information Directorate (AFRL/IF). ITT Corporation manages and operates the DACS, serving as a 
centralized source for current, available data and information regarding Software Engineering and Software 
Technology. Site address: https://www.thedacs.com/ - accessed June 25, 2007.   
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As mentioned above, the theoretical maximum or final carrying capacity for 
knowledge for our model will be a value of 10 based on Technology Readiness Levels 
(TRL).  How fast an organization reaches this maximum capacity depends on the 
organization’s respective knowledge building rate.  As the number of program iterations 
is increased and CMMI levels are maximized, the knowledge building rate approaches 
one (1) TRL knowledge unit per year.  One TRL unit per year is our maximum rate for 
knowledge building (Maximum Fractional KM Rate).  As unit production and CMMI 
level are minimized due to a low number of program iterations or a low CMMI level, the 
rate of knowledge building is minimized and the knowledge building rate approaches 
zero.  A zero rate represents no new knowledge units over time and no advancement in 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL).  Knowledge Loss is how much resident 
organizational knowledge leaves the system primarily due to the turnover of personnel.  
This rate is based upon the organization’s retirement rate. 
The model is initialized to the current knowledge level of the system (technical 
maturity) and represents how knowledge builds over time. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Knowledge Management Sub-Model 
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We now apply the Knowledge Management sub-model to the DoD Software 
Acquisition Process. 
C. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT APPLIED TO SOFTWARE 
ACQUISITION MODEL  
In our model knowledge and experience directly translate to added capability.  
According to GAO’s recent report and assessment of selected major weapons programs, 
this is indeed the case.  GAO uses a knowledge metric for each milestone (GAO, 2007): 
• Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. A sound business case is 
made for the product where customer’s requirements and the developer’s 
available resources in terms of knowledge, time, money, and capacity 
match. The technologies needed to meet essential product requirements 
have been demonstrated to work in their intended environment. 
• Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. Completion of at least 90 
percent of engineering drawings at the system design review provides 
tangible evidence that the design is stable. 
• Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature and the design is 
reliable. This point is achieved when it has been demonstrated that the 
company can manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality 
targets. A best practice is to ensure that all key manufacturing processes 
are in statistical control—that is, they are repeatable. 
We will take the DoD Acquisition process and apply our Knowledge 




Figure 14.   System Dynamics Model Representation of DoD Acquisition System 
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We will baseline model with the following parameters: 
 
 
Table 2.   Model Parameters 
The Knowledge Retirement rate is a graphical function predicting a drop in 
knowledge level due to aging workforce.  As the Baby Boom generation enters the 
retirement window, we can expect an increase from 3.5 percent to 20 percent.2  The Baby 
Boom generation represents 76% of DoD’s resident knowledge that must be replaced or 
built upon.  If the Baby Boom generation left at one instant in time, it would equate to a 
7.6 TRL drop in knowledge based on our model scale.  The current average retirement 
rate is 3.5 percent.  It is estimated that 20 percent will take retirement after they initially 
enter retirement window.  Multiplying 7.6 times the current average retirement rate and 
future estimated retirement rate gives us our retirement rate in terms of knowledge units. 
(7.6 * .035 = .266 and 7.6 * .2 = 1.52)  The jump from .266 to 1.52 occurs at 
approximately 2012 where the majority of Baby Boomers will enter the retirement 
window assuming a retirement age of 66. 
 
                                                 
2 The Baby Boom generation comprises 76% of the acquisition workforce and will reach retirement 
window approximately 2012.  (Defense Acquisition Structures and Capabilities Review, 2007). 
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Figure 15.   Graphical Representation of Retirement Rate 
The JROC Validation Rate is a graphical function relating the level of 
requirement knowledge to process speed.  A high level of knowledge and urgency of 
need equates to a faster requirement process.3     
 
                                                 
3 An example of a high knowledge, urgent needs requirement is the infrared (IR) sight for the M1A1 
tank. The M1A1 tanks had no IR sights for the .50 caliber gun system. Using the Quick Reaction Fund 
(QRF), an integrated IR sight for the tank system was designed, packaged, and tested. This process was 
done in a matter of months, and led to the retrofit by U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command of nearly 500 
M1A1's in the Marine Corps inventory—all within a year. (Young, 2007). 
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Figure 16.   Graphical Representation of JROC Validation Rate 
These are the key assumptions and formulations.  The full list of model equations 
is listed in Appendix B.  
D. BUDGET PERFORMANCE SUBSYSTEM 
To measure budget performance we create the following sub-model. This model 
captures the flow of work through the system as the level of knowledge improves.  As the 
flow of actual work is captured, a labor rate is used to keep track of resources consumed.  
This labor rate is applied to the actual personnel producing work to calculate the amount 
of resources consumed to produce actual work. Expended resources are then compared to 












Figure 17.   Sub-Model to Capture Budget Performance 
We have developed the above models to relate the level of knowledge to the flow 
of work through the system.  We will now simulate a baseline case as well as possible 
interventions to optimize and improve the system. 
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V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We will now take the models developed in Chapter IV and run simulations to 
explore and gather insights into the system.  Our experiments will look at platform-
centric versus domain-centric policies and how knowledge affects system output. 
A. SIMULATIONS SCENARIOS 
We will simulate four scenarios: 
1) The Current “As-Is” System 
2) The Current As-Is System with Spiral Development 
3) A Proposed Domain-Centric Model 
4) A Proposed Domain-Centric Model with Enterprise Integration 
1. The Current System: Project-Centric Approach with Knowledge 
Attenuation Due to Aging Workforce 
DoD’s current platform-centric model often exceeds development costs by 30-40 
percent with missed deadlines and performance shortfalls. (GAO, 2006).  A large number 
of the systems in development are new and immature.  Programs continue to proceed 
through milestone review points with low levels of knowledge.  The parameters below 
are assumed for an immature system under development by a DoD agency. 
• Capability Maturity Model Integration Level = 3. 
• Initial Technology Readiness Level = 4. 
• Number of Iterations: 1. 




Figure 18.   Simulated System Level of Knowledge 
As a large complex system is developed over a number of years some knowledge 
is gained due to learning, but also some knowledge is lost due to personnel turnover. In 
Figure 18, the knowledge loss rate due to retirement of the Baby Boom generation is 
greater than the knowledge building rate.  
Due to the low knowledge level, technical capacity and the number of fielded 
systems is at a low level. 
 
 





Figure 20.   Budget Performance 
With DoD’s current platform-centric model, cost overruns typically average 30-
40% with the majority of cost growth after the critical design review inherent in 
Milestone B.  This cost growth is largely attributed to low technology readiness levels 
and immature technologies. (GAO, 2006)  Future cost overruns are expected to be 
considerably higher due to the Baby Boom generation starting to leave the system at an 
increased rate. 
The current “as-is” model suggests that the upcoming shift in workforce 
composition due to retirement of the Baby Boom generation will further accelerate cost 
overruns due to low levels of resident knowledge and reduced technical capacity.   
2. Intervention #1: Low Technology with High Iteration Runs (Project-
Centric with Spiral Development)  
On October 30, 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz cancelled 
the existing defense acquisition guidance documents DoDD 5000.1, DoDI 5000.2, and 
DoD 5000.2-R. In his memorandum, Wolfowitz stated that his objectives were to foster 
efficiency, creativity, and innovation, and to streamline mandatory acquisition procedures 
and processes to meet warfighter needs. The interim guidance directed that “continuous 
examination and adoption of innovative practices” be encouraged and that spiral 
development be the preferred process in any evolutionary acquisition strategy. (PM 
Magazine, 2003)  This second simulation run represents a spiral development acquisition 
strategy with multiple iterations.  We will capture the effects of the spiral development 
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policy by increasing the number of iterations similar to the number of builds in a spiral 
development production cycle.  Each iteration will represent one software build or one 
added increment of capability.  The parameters below are assumed for this scenario: 
Capability Maturity Model Integration Level = 4. 
• Initial Technology Readiness Level = 1. 
• Number of Iterations: 10. 
• External Release Process Delay = 2 years. 
 
 
Figure 21.   Intervention #1 Level of Knowledge 
The high number of iterations rapidly builds the knowledge level of the 
technology until retirement rate starts to degrade knowledge level. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Intervention #1 Number of Fielded Systems 
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In Figure 22, technical capacity builds with each iteration until stabilizing around 
ten year point. 
 
 
Figure 23.   Intervention #1 Budget Performance 
For budget performance, a cost overrun occurs due to the initial low level of 
technology but the rate of cost growth lessens after the five year point.  The rate of cost 
growth minimizes due to the increased knowledge level, but the retirement rate continues 
to degrade knowledge which continues to result in a positive cost growth rate. 
The simulation of DoD’s spiral development strategy shows that from a 
knowledge standpoint, spiral development is an effective strategy that can be used to 
increase the knowledge building rate and mitigate the effects of a large retiring 
population.  Spiral development can also be used to control costs but over a longer 
period. 
3. Intervention #2: Stable Technology with High Iteration Runs 
(Domain-Centric with Product-Line Architecture)  
Key success factors for software development are short time-to-market, high 
product quality, and lower costs.  Systematic reuse throughout the development life cycle 
is required to achieve these goals.  Systematic reuse builds technical maturity and 
stability by repeat usage and development.  To achieve systematic reuse, the products 
must share a common structure or architecture.  For a common structure or architecture to 
be effective, there must be a domain-centric view of the organization with the ability to 
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enforce standards throughout the domain.  We will capture the effects of a product-line 
architecture with systematic reuse by increasing the initial Technology Readiness Level 
(TRL) and by increasing the number of iterations.  The below parameters are assumed for 
a domain-centric organization with a product-line architecture. 
• Capability Maturity Model Integration Level = 4. 
• Initial Technology Readiness Level = 7. 
• Number of Iterations: 8. 
• External Release Process Delay = 2 years. 
 
Figure 24.   Intervention #2 Level of Knowledge 
The knowledge building rate increases and then stabilizes at a high level until the 
retirement rate starts to exert its effect.  The knowledge loss due to higher retirement rate 
reduces the knowledge level from approximately 9.5 to 7.5.   
 
Figure 25.   Intervention #2 Delivered Systems 
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For a domain-centric organization with a product-line architecture, the simulation 
shows that technical maturity and capacity rapidly grow and then stabilizes at the five 
year point.  This is consistent with the CelsiusTech case study where after five years, 
CelsiusTech was able to produce the benefits of a product line architecture with shorter 
time to market, better cost estimation, and improved product quality. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Intervention #2 Budget Performance 
The domain-centric model reliably predicts costs and meets budget predictions 
even with a large drop in resident knowledge due to the retirement rate. 
The simulation of a domain-centric model with a product-line architecture builds 
knowledge and technical capacity.  The domain-centric model also mitigates the effect of 
the Baby Boom generation entering the retirement window.  Both the Domain-centric 
model with a product-line architecture and the Platform-centric model with spiral 
development show a delta of two increments for knowledge loss.  The domain-centric 
model, however, reaches technical maturity faster and with better cost estimation.  
4. Intervention #3 – Domain-Centric Organization with Regional 
Software Acquisition Centers (Radical Option) 
This simulation shows the effect of a highly integrated software enterprise with a 
product-line architecture.  An end-end value stream for software is created with intra-
agency services provided onsite by collocated personnel.  We will capture the effects of a 
highly integrated and optimized software enterprise by increasing the CMMI level, 
maximizing the initial Technology Readiness Level, increasing the number of iterations, 
44 
and by reducing process delays.  The below parameters are assumed for a regionally 
located software enterprise with a product-line architecture in operation. 
• Capability Maturity Model Integration Level = 5. 
• Initial Technology Readiness Level = 10. 
• Number of Iterations = 10. 
• External Release Process Delay = 1. 
 
Figure 27.   Intervention #3 – Level of Knowledge 
The knowledge building rate is at a high level until retirement rate starts to exert 
its effect.  The knowledge loss due to a higher retirement rate reduces the knowledge 
level from approximately 9.5 to 8.2. 
 
 
Figure 28.   Intervention #3 – Delivered Systems 
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Due to the tighter integration of processes, delays are reduced, and technical 
maturity occurs in 2.5 years instead of approximately 5.0 years for a loosely coupled 
domain-centric organization, and 10 years for a platform-centric organization. 
 
 
Figure 29.   Intervention #3 - Budget Performance 
The domain-centric, software enterprise model reliably predicts costs and meets 
budget predictions despite knowledge loss due to retirement rate.   
B. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
Table 3.   Summary of Results 
The current baseline system will experience a significant knowledge loss with the 
Baby Boom generation entering the retirement window.  This model does not take into 
account current formal training methods and their influence.  It is unlikely that formal 
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training methods will bring knowledge level up to speed as quickly as informal training 
methods based on actual experience.  This is debatable and an area for further 
development and study. 
Based on our simulation results, the DoD policy for Spiral Development is 
effective from a knowledge standpoint.  Spiral Development builds technical maturity 
and experience of the workforce.  From a project-centric standpoint, however, cycle time 
is not reduced by this approach and the experience gained is project or vendor specific.  
Also, the longer a program’s cycle time, the more influence and instability is placed on 
the system by turnover of personnel and financial instability. (DAPA, 2006) 
A Domain-centric approach builds technical maturity, reinforces workforce 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
System Dynamics is an effective way to gather as well as explain tacit knowledge.  
This model is a high level, proof of concept model that has not been validated. This 
model can and should be expanded further to the actual program level for finer detail and 
discovery.  The Defense Capabilities and Structure Assessment (DoD, 2005) gives the 
impression that DoD’s past organizational changes or initiatives have no observable 
effect.  This impression seems largely based on DoD’s inability to show positive effects 
with any reliable metrics.  If we examine commercial industry, we see that organizational 
structure and the ability to sense and respond to the environment is pivotal for survival 
and growth.  The environment is surely changing for DoD and we must respond to these 
changes or become marginalized in technical capability. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several initiatives that may act a “tipping point” for the acquisition 
system.  The strongest enabler is the Open Source Technology initiative.  (DoD, 2006)  A 
limiting factor for product-line development and information sharing is proprietary, 
vendor specific artifacts.  Open source software with complementary contracting 
practices may break down this barrier and allow better information sharing between 
vendors and various communities.  An area of further research would be to look at the 
commercial industry’s incentives for open source software and determine what 
contracting and procurement mechanisms DoD can use to reinforce adoption of Open 
Source software with and between different prime contractors as well as the use of these 
artifacts with and between different government agencies. 
Another area of further study would be to look at the level of knowledge required 
and the costs to maintain that level of knowledge in regards to commercially developed 
software versus government developed software.  It is well known that Industry can 
develop and produce software cheaper and faster than DoD.  Maintenance and lifecycle 
support costs are where most of the cost resides, not development.  Would DoD be better 
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served to invest in this capability and the required level of knowledge or continue to rely 
on Industry?  These are all challenging questions that can be answered from a 




APPENDIX A. SHIPMAIN PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAMS 
 




Figure 31.   SHIPMAIN Phase I 
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Figure 33.   SHIPMAIN Phase III 
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APPENDIX B. MODEL EQUATIONS 
Budget Performance 
 
Actual_Costs_Incurred(t) = Actual_Costs_Incurred(t dt) 
+ (Actual_Spend_Rate) * dt 
INIT Actual_Costs_Incurred = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Actual_Spend_Rate = Actual_Personnel * Labor_Rate 
Budgeted_Cost_for_Program = 140 * 365000 
DOCUMENT: 3500 SLOC / 25 = 140 System Function Points 
Each milestone (system function point) costs $365,000 
140 System Function Points * 365,000 = $ 5,100,000 Total 
Budgeted Cost for Milestone C 
Budgeted_Cost_of_Work_Performed = 
Total_Work*(Budgeted_Cost_for_Program/350000) 
CPI = if Actual_Costs_Incurred >0 then Budgeted_Cost_of_Work_Performed / 
Actual_Costs_Incurred else 1 
DOCUMENT: Cost Performance Index 
Total_Work = Milestone_A+Milestone_B+Milestone_C+Fielded_Requirement 
Actual_Personnel = GRAPH(Knowledge_Level) 
(0.00, 99.1), (1.00, 74.3), (2.00, 37.5), (3.00, 25.5), (4.00, 21.0), (5.00, 19.5), 
(6.00, 15.8), (7.00, 14.3), (8.00, 
12.8), (9.00, 11.3), (10.0, 10.0) 
Actual_Productivity = GRAPH(Knowledge_Level) 
(0.00, 366), (1.00, 429), (2.00, 508), (3.00, 634), (4.00, 760), (5.00, 949), (6.00, 
1358), (7.00, 2900), (8.00, 
3200), (9.00, 3365), (10.0, 3455) 
Labor_Rate = GRAPH(Knowledge_Level) 
(0.00, 363650), (1.00, 363200), (2.00, 362300), (3.00, 358700), (4.00, 332479), 
(5.00, 301100), (6.00, 
283550), (7.00, 278600), (8.00, 275900), (9.00, 275900), (10.0, 275900) 
DOCUMENT: 1000 Dollars / personday 




Knowledge_Level(t) = Knowledge_Level(t dt) 
+ (Knowledge_Building Knowledge_ 
Leaving) * dt 
INIT Knowledge_Level = Technical_Maturity 
INFLOWS: 
Knowledge_Building = Fractional_KM_Rate*Knowledge_Level 
OUTFLOWS: 
Knowledge_Leaving = Retirement_Rate 
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CMMI_Level = 5 
Fractional_KM_Rate = Maximum_Fractional_KM_Rate * (1 ( 
Knowledge_Level/KM_Capacity)^(M 1))/( 
M 1) 
DOCUMENT: The fractional KM building rate is a growth function of knowledge 
relative to knowledge 
carrying capacity. The parameter M from the Richards growth model determines 
the strengh of the 
nonlinearity. 
1/Period 
KM_Capacity = 10 
1 
M 
= (((10/Number_of_Production_Cycles) + (5/CMMI_Level)) / 2 ) + .1 
DOCUMENT: Strength of Learning Curve determined by Unit Theory and 
Process Value Assessment (CMMI 
Model) 
Maximum_Fractional_KM_Rate = 1 
DOCUMENT: The maximum fractional growth rate is set to 1, thus scaling time 
so that 1 time unit = 1/g* 
(yielding the standard logistic curve). 
1/Period 
Number_of_Production_Cycles = 10 
DOCUMENT: # Projects / Time Period Application 
of Unit Theory Principles and Product Line Approach 
Technical_Maturity = 1 
Retirement_Rate = GRAPH(TIME) 
(0.00, 0.15), (1.00, 0.6), (2.00, 0.85), (3.00, 1.05), (4.00, 1.45), (5.00, 2.40), 
(6.00, 4.75), (7.00, 4.75), (8.00, 
4.75), (9.00, 1.95), (10.0, 1.70) 
 
Software Acquistion and Fielding Process (DoD 5000.2) 
 
Added_Capability(t) = Added_Capability(t dt) 
+ (Fielding_Rate) * dt 
INIT Added_Capability = Min(Milestone_C/dt,Actual_Deployment_Rate) 
INFLOWS: 
Fielding_Rate = Actual_Deployment_Rate 
Build1(t) = Build1(t dt) 
+ (Spiral_Development) * dt 
INIT Build1 = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Spiral_Development = Technology_Development_Rate 
Fielded_Requirement(t) = Fielded_Requirement(t dt) 
+ (Actual_Deployment_Rate Obsolescence_ 
Rate Obsolescence_ 
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Rate2) * dt 
INIT Fielded_Requirement = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Actual_Deployment_Rate = if (Percent_Complete >= .80) Then 
Min(Milestone_C/dt,(Potential_Deployment_Rate/(External_Release_Process + 
1))) else 0 
OUTFLOWS: 
Obsolescence_Rate = Fielded_Requirement /Program_Termination 
Obsolescence_Rate2 = Obsolescence_Rate 
Milestone_A(t) = Milestone_A(t dt) 
+ (Requirements_Generation_Rate Technology_ 
Design_Rate) * dt 
INIT Milestone_A = 0 
DOCUMENT: 1 System Function can have anywhere from 5K 25K 
lines of ADA code: 25KSLCO per 
System Function 
140 maximum System Functions for CelsiusTech Case Study 




Generation_Rate = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 




Milestone_B(t) = Milestone_B(t dt) 
+ (Technology_Design_Rate Technology_ 
Development_Rate) * dt 







Milestone_C(t) = Milestone_C(t dt) 
+ (Technology_Development_Rate Actual_ 
Deployment_Rate Fielding_ 
Rate) * dt 
INIT Milestone_C = 0 
DOCUMENT: 140 maximum System Functions for CelsiusTech Case Study 
1 System Function can have anywhere from 5K 25K 
lines of ADA code: 25KSLCO / System Function 






Actual_Deployment_Rate = if (Percent_Complete >= .80) Then 
Min(Milestone_C/dt,(Potential_Deployment_Rate/(External_Release_Process + 
1))) else 0 
Fielding_Rate = Actual_Deployment_Rate 
Planned_N_R(t) = Planned_N_R(t dt) 
+ (Gen_of_New_Req Requirements_ 
Generation_Rate) * dt 
INIT Planned_N_R = Planned_New_Requirements 
TRANSIT TIME = varies 
INFLOW LIMIT = INF 
CAPACITY = INF 
INFLOWS: 
Gen_of_New_Req = Unplanned_New_Requirements/Discovery_Delay 
OUTFLOWS: 
Requirements_Generation_Rate = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
TRANSIT TIME = Planned_N_R/JROC_Validation_Delay 
Planned_New_Requirements(t) = Planned_New_Requirements(t dt) 
+ (Obsolescence_Rate2) * dt 
INIT Planned_New_Requirements = 1500 
INFLOWS: 
Obsolescence_Rate2 = Obsolescence_Rate 
Unplanned_New_Requirements(t) = Unplanned_New_Requirements(t dt) 
+ (Gen_ 
of_New_Req) * dt 
INIT Unplanned_New_Requirements = 2000 
OUTFLOWS: 
Gen_of_New_Req = Unplanned_New_Requirements/Discovery_Delay 
Average_Project_Size = 3500 
3 
Discovery_ 
Delay = 1 
DOCUMENT: Delay Time to Identify New Unplanned Requirements 
(Years) 
External_Release_Process = 2.5 
Percent_Complete = Build1/Average_Project_Size 
Potential_Deployment_Rate = 3500/1 
Program_Termination = 10 
JROC_Validation_Delay = GRAPH(Knowledge_Level) 
(0.00, 70.0), (1.00, 158), (2.00, 280), (3.00, 420), (4.00, 770), (5.00, 2205), (6.00, 
2660), (7.00, 3028), (8.00, 
3255), (9.00, 3465), (10.0, 3483) 
Technology_Design_Validation_Rate = GRAPH(Knowledge_Level) 
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(0.00, 3535), (1.00, 3780), (2.00, 4060), (3.00, 4375), (4.00, 4830), (5.00, 5775), 
(6.00, 8785), (7.00, 9590), 
(8.00, 10045), (9.00, 10185), (10.0, 10500) 
Not in a sector 
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